Everyone wants clean air, peace and other public goods but is tempted to freeride on others' efforts. The usual way out of this dilemma is to impose norms, maintain reputations and incentivize individuals to contribute. In situations of high uncertainty, however, such as confrontations of protesters with a dictatorial regime, the usual measures are not feasible, but cooperation can be achieved nevertheless. We use an asymmetric Ising model to show numerically how public goods can be realized. Under uncertainty, people use the heuristic of conformity. The turmoil of a confrontation causes some individuals to cooperate accidentally, and at a critical level of turmoil, they entail a cascade of cooperation. This critical level is much lower in small networks.
Introduction
A main benefit for people living in groups, ranging from families to empires, is that collectively, they can achieve more than the sum of individuals can independently, namely collective goods [8] . Cases in point are infrastructure, defense and education for a country's population. The provision of these goods is non-obvious, because individuals are tempted to freeride on others' efforts, making cooperation a dilemma [13] . It is usually solved over time if people get to know one another and develop norms and a network to transmit information (gossip), on the basis of which reputations are established and some individuals (possibly leaders) deliver rewards or punishments to win over others to cooperate [6, 12] .
This scenario is well-covered by the literature, but there are important cases where it doesn't work, namely when time is short, uncertainty is high, a group with a network may not yet have formed, and there are no leaders to organize the crowd. Examples are sudden disasters where many victims need urgent help, protests against dictatorial regimes that prevent critics to organize themselves, and unplanned violent confrontations. In these situations, people realize that cooperation might yield a valuable outcome but they can't assess benefits and costs-will they get hurt?-hence rational decision making is not feasible. Our questions are how cooperation under uncertainty is self-organized, and how this is influenced by participants' network.
Under high uncertainty, people use the heuristic of conformism, which may turn out bad for them in a specific situation but may serve them on average over many occasions [14] . Conformism can be observed as behavioral synchronization [10] . When people conform to their initially defecting network neighbors, they might eventually cooperate when many others do, but who would start cooperating?
Pending (or starting) violence and disaster are characterized by increasing turmoil, which can be measured by participant's heart rates that indicate their arousal [9] or, in an information theoretic manner, by accelerating situational updates to the same effect. Arousal causes "trembling hands" [5] as game theorists say, denoting a chance that some individuals accidentally cooperate, which in turn might entail a cascade of cooperation. Examples of turmoil are soccer fans of opposing teams who provoke each other to a boiling point, when fighting breaks out. To show that turmoil can drive cooperation, we use an Ising model [3] , which in our case is asymmetric. This provides a parsimonious explanation of cooperation without the usual mechanisms.
Model
At the beginning there is a group of n individuals who may not know one another yet, in an uncertain situation. Each of them has at least visual contact with some others, and identifies with, and is therefore inclined to conform to, others who share an interest in a given public good. The network of visual or verbal ties A ij denoting that i pays attention to j is represented by a row-normalized adjacency matrix with cells a ij = A ij / j A ij , as in many models of social influence [7] , hence j a ij = 1. Ties are bi-directional but asymmetric, and the network may have multiple disconnected components. An individual can cooperate (C) or defect (D) with C > D > 0, and every- 
The mean degree of cooperation is described by an order parameter M = 1/n n i=1 S i . A cooperator's payoff is a share of the public good at a cost P C = r(M + C/n) − C, with a synergy parameter r > 1; a defector's payoff is P D = r(M − D/n). In conventional game theory, C = 1 and D = 0, but because payoffs are used only comparatively, it does not matter if they are negative here. Rather than maximizing payoffs directly, the actors in our model minimize H. This is implemented computationally by the Metropolis algorithm [1] , where randomly chosen nodes flip their behavior, S. The decision to accept a flip is based on exponentially weighing the change in H, which depends on the level of turmoil, T [1] . H/n can be regarded as mean dissatisfaction with respect to the conformity heuristic, biased towards cooperation for the public good. The relation between H/n and M is illustrated in Fig. 1 There is a chance p for ties to be rewired. If p = 0, the clusters are fully connected cliques, mutually disconnected. The network at p = 0.01 is shown at the inset and with a dotted line in the M − T plot. If p = 1 the network becomes essentially a random graph, with a higher T c .
net with n = 20 including all micro states (configurations of C's and D's) therein, and in a mean field approach (MF) for comparison. The Metropolis minimization of H starts at the defective state (at the left) and evolves by random steps over all micro states until the lowest value of H is reached at the cooperative state (at the right).
Results
The relation between cooperation, M , and turmoil, T , turns out to be qualitatively the same for all networks. At low turmoil, there is no cooperation but it emerges at a critical level T c , illustrated in Fig. 2 . Then the turmoil overcomes the "energy" barrier (the mountain in Fig. 1) , and drives the transition to the cooperative state. For as long as T < T c , the chance that this happens in a finite number of Monte Carlo steps is zero. If T keeps increasing beyond T c , the effect of turmoil becomes progressively more dominant until individuals randomly alternate cooperation and defection. If not by this chaos, cooperation will end when the public good is realized, oth- Figure 3 : Effect of increasing rewiring on the tipping point T c in a n = 100 graph with 10 clusters, n = 10 each, as in Fig. 2 . Again, S = {1, −1/2}. A unit at the horizontal axis means that three nodes are randomly chosen with 1 and 2 connected but not 1 and 3. Then 1's tie to 2 is relayed to 3. Plus signs show variation across simulation runs. ers intervene, the participants get exhausted, or if they get to understand the situation (i.e. their uncertainty lowers) and start behaving strategically (i.e. freeride). Social networks, if large, are clustered and sparse with a skewed degree distribution [11] . We therefore examine the effects of clustering, density, degree distribution and size on the tipping point T c , and subsequently zoom in on local variations of S. As a characteristic example of clustering, we start with ten cliques (fully connected networks) with n = 10 each (Fig. 2) . When randomly rewiring ties with a probability p, the network becomes more random at higher p and thereby less clustered, as in small world networks [11] . Decreasing clustering results in increasing T c . When examining this relation in more detail (Fig. 3) , it becomes clear that changes of clustering have the largest effect on T c at small numbers of rewired ties. The effect of network size on the tipping point is larger than of clustering, in particular at the smallest network sizes (Fig. 4) . T c is also lower in sparser networks but this effect is much weaker than of size and more variable across simulation runs (not shown). When varying the degree distribution between Poisson and power law, 
with a bias S 0 = (C − D)/2 and an increment ∆ = (C + D)/2. Accordingly, the values chosen in our examples imply S 0 = 0.25 and ∆ = 0.75. Elsewhere we show that the Hamiltonian, once written in a symmetric form, becomes a conventional Ising model plus a global external field and a locally varying field that depends on the network [2] . We use this generalized form in a mean field analysis, from which we infer that for given ∆, higher S 0 (that corresponds to a stronger interest in the public good) results in lower T c [2] . We now use different S 0 in a network with two clusters, keeping ∆ = 0.75. When p = 0 the two groups are disconnected, but within-group links can be randomly rewired with a probability p and thereby connect the two groups. In Fig. 5 , two two-cluster networks (n = 20) with p = 0 and p = 0. Figure 5 : Networks with two groups at T = 0.09. Top row: two disconnected cliques (p = 0, n = 10), with S 0 = 0.50 (top) and S 0 = 0.25 (bottom), respectively. The group with higher S 0 cooperates after few Monte Carlo steps whereas the group with lower S 0 does not cooperate. Bottom row: the same two groups are now connected by random rewiring the ties with a chance p = 0.1. The group with higher S 0 wins over the other group to cooperate. The different gray tones for the two cooperating subgroups (below, right) are due to their different S 0 .
of similar people, here in terms of their interests, clustering together [11] . For the network with disconnected groups, the group with lower S 0 does not reach its tipping point. When the groups are connected (p = 0.1), the group with higher S 0 helps the other group to cooperate at lower T c than it would on its own, whereas the former is somewhat held back by the latter. This result generalizes to small numbers of initiative takers with higher S 0 embedded in a network of many others with lower S 0 , where the initiative takers reduce T c for the majority (not shown).
We used an asymmetric Ising model to show that under high uncertainty, the dilemma of cooperation can be solved by situational turmoil, and more complicated and costly mechanisms are not necessary. This solution holds for a broad range of networks, although the critical level of turmoil is markedly lower for small ones, which implies that turmoil-driven cooperation is more likely in small than in large groups. This result is consistent with empirical findings on violent group confrontations, where most of the physical violence is committed by small subgroups [4] . Small fighting groups increase overall turmoil, though, which can agitate larger groups to join. Future studies could confront the model with empirical data, perhaps even on different species, and also investigate more systematically the numbers of necessary Monte Carlo steps for different networks and distributions of S 0 .
